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Conflicts that turn violent create their own dynamics and gen-
erate further enmity, revenge, and wounds that render the 
threshold to violence a point of no return (Jentleson 2000). A 
key task for conflict research is therefore to grasp the dynamics 
of violence.1 Conflict research often focuses on the structural 
and motivational conditions for violence but rarely addresses 
the questions of how violence comes about and evolves.  
 
@ Isabel Bramsen, ib@cric.ku.dk 
Previously, most researchers have been unable to observe 
violence at close quarters and therefore had to rely on proxies, 
such as numbers of battle deaths. With an increasing amount 
of social life, including violence, being filmed by authorities as 
well as laypeople, researchers can better investigate how vio-
lence actually occurs and unfolds. 
The current article grasps the opportunity offered by this tech-
nological shift and the micro-dynamics of violent interactions 
1 Violence is defined here as behavior involving 
physical force that can hurt, damage, or kill a per-
son. 
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This article builds on the recent trend of analyzing violent interaction through visual data, but goes one step further than existing 
research studying the emergence of violence by investigating the micro-dynamics of how violence evolves. The article applies 
micro-sociological analysis of video material from the uprisings in Bahrain, Tunisia, and Syria as well as interviews with activists, 
opposition politicians, and journalists from the three countries. The material supports Randall Collins’s (2008) argument that the 
emergence of violence is constrained by particular situational circumstances where the perpetrator is able to dominate the victim 
and/or to avoid direct contact with the victim. However, contrary to what one might expect if emotional domination precedes 
violence, this does not mean that attacks are rarely followed by counter violence. Rather, this article argues that violence is often 
reciprocal with parties mirroring each other in action-reaction sequences. Hence, violence can be considered a form of interaction 
ritual in its own right – a dance-like sequence – initially inhibited by the human tendency to fall into each other’s rhythms, but 
once initiated promoted by exactly that tendency. 
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in the Arab uprisings in Bahrain, Tunisia, and Syria. It builds 
on the methodological and theoretical advances by the Amer-
ican sociologist, Randall Collins. By analyzing visual data Col-
lins has developed a micro-sociology of violence arguing that 
violence is inhibited by tension and fear and shaped by dy-
namics of emotional domination. The article adds to the body 
of micro-sociological literature with a unique video dataset of 
violence and nonviolence in the Arab uprisings in Bahrain, Tu-
nisia, and Syria coupled with interviews and participatory ob-
servation. The article supports but also challenges Collins’s 
theory by showing how violence can also be considered a re-
ciprocal ritual rather than merely one-sided or asymmetrical, 
arguing that once violence breaks out it tends to acquire its 
own self-perpetuating action-reaction mechanism whereby 
domination in the situation becomes less important. Thus, vi-
olence can be considered an interaction ritual in its own right, 
with characteristics similar to cooperative interaction; that is, 
rhythmic entrainment and mirroring the actions of the other 
part.  
The article proceeds as follows. Firstly, I present Collins mi-
cro-sociological theory and review its application to contexts of 
relevance to this study as well as the treatment of the reciproc-
ity of violence in the literature. Secondly, I describe the meth-
ods used and the contexts of the three Arab uprisings. Thirdly, 
I analyze the micro-dynamics of how violence occurs and 
evolves, arguing that it often follows a pattern of action-reac-
tion that makes us rethink violence as a social interaction ritual 
resembling a dance-like sequence.2 
 
1. Collins’s Micro-sociological Theory of Violence 
Collins’s basic assumption is that humans aspire to maximize 
emotional energy, an aggregated level of positive emotions 
that is foundational for agency (Bramsen and Poder 2014). 
Along with solidarity, this emotional energy is generated in 
what Collins coins “interaction rituals” consisting of situations 
where humans are bodily co-present, have a mutual focus of 
 
2 I use dance as a metaphor to indicate similarities 
between dancing and fighting, including how a 
body falls into the other’s physical rhythms without 
much reflection (when improvising), rhythmic turn 
taking, and mirroring of the partner.  
3 Interaction rituals also produce symbols of social 
relationship and standards of morality, but these 
attention, feel a barrier to outsiders, and share a mood (Collins 
2004). Such rituals can be more or less successful and intense 
depending, for example, on the degree of mutual focus of at-
tention, and thus produce various levels of group solidarity and 
emotional energy.3 
Not all interactions produce solidarity and energize all in-
volved parties, however. Collins (2004) argues that some ritu-
als of power and status (here referred to as domination rituals, 
cf. Bramsen and Poder 2014) energize one party and deener-
gize the other through actions of domination. One party sets 
the rhythm of interaction and the other party follows submis-
sively.  
As argued by Bramsen and Poder (2014), as well as Boyns 
and Leury (2015), interaction rituals are not always structured 
as solidarity-generating cooperative interaction or asymmetric 
domination interaction. Interaction rituals can also be charac-
terized by conflict; these should not be considered failed inter-
action rituals, but rather interaction rituals in their own right, 
producing tension and negative emotional energy.4 
Collins’s theory has been applied to many social phenomena, 
from research communities through the tobacco industry to sex 
and violence. His Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory (2008) 
sets out to explain all types of violent actions across cases – 
from domestic violence to hooligan fights to war – on the as-
sumption that there are similar micro-sociological dynamics in 
every violent incident, despite contextual differences. Rather 
than analyzing violence in terms of numbers of battle deaths, 
experience of fighting, or study of the background conditions 
for violence, such as culture or poverty, Collins studies micro-
situations of violence in visual data. His surprising conclusion 
is that we have generally misunderstood violent interaction as 
long, competent fights occurring between two actors of equal 
size and strength, as in Hollywood Westerns or action movies. 
This myth stems from our inability to observe violence directly 
in its actual unfolding. Even interviews with fighters tend to rep-
licate the myths portrayed for example in Hollywood Westerns, 
elements are not central to this analysis, and there-
fore not further discussed here.  
4 Bramsen and Poder (forthcoming) identify three 
broad categories of interaction relevant in conflicts; 
cooperative interaction (equivalent to Collins’s gen-
eral usage of interaction rituals), domination inter-
action, and conflictual interaction. These categories 
will be used throughout this article.   
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because the glamourous portrait of violence has been internal-
ized. Collins proposes a new research agenda for studying vi-
olence: to study videos and pictures of un-staged violence. Af-
ter studying visual material, Collins finds violence to be 
significantly different than one might expect from watching ac-
tion movies. Violent episodes are often short, incompetent, 
and carried out against weak and vulnerable victims. The com-
mon belief is that violent behavior is something individuals 
easily turn to if they are sufficiently motivated. Collins turns this 
logic around, arguing that violence is difficult and only occurs 
under specific situational circumstances: that “violent interac-
tions are difficult because they go against the grain of normal 
interaction rituals” (2008, 20). Thus, violence is shaped by a 
field of confrontational tension and fear that inhibits violence 
or makes it incompetent or ineffective. Violence therefore oc-
curs under a limited set of circumstances. Collins describes 
five pathways to violence: 1) Attacking a weak victim, as when 
the victim is outnumbered or displays a weak body posture (for 
example ducking or shrinking). 2) Group-oriented weapons 
and tactics generating emotional solidarity in conducting vio-
lence, as when a group is trained to act in a coordinated man-
ner, for example marching rhythmically in step. Group-oriented 
action directs the focus of attention away from the enemy and 
toward fellow fighters. 3) Audience-oriented violence, where 
fighters direct attention away from the opponent and toward 
an audience that applauds and supports them. 4) Technical 
focus of attention or distant violence, where the perpetrator is 
not interacting with the victim. 5) The clandestine approach, in 
which no hostile confrontation is expressed until violence is 
conducted at a close range (Collins 2008). 
 
1.1. Violence and Situational Domination 
Collins’s micro-sociological theory of violence has been ap-
plied to a range of cases where emotional domination pre-
cedes violence. For example, Klusemann (2009, 2010a, 
2012) applies Collins’s approach to analyze the genocides in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica, showing how emotional domination 
is a condition for violence even in situations where orders are 
given. Given that Klusemann focuses on genocides and one-
 
5 This is meant as a descriptive rather than a nor-
mative statement. 
sided violence, the reciprocal elements of violence are less im-
portant to his analysis – which therefore has no place for the 
way emotional domination quickly shifts or becomes less im-
portant in two-sided violence (the focus of this article). Another 
application of Collins’s micro-sociological approach, which is 
of particular relevance to this article, is that of Anne Nassauer 
(2013, 2016). On the basis of a comprehensive visual data 
analysis of 30 left-wing demonstrations in the United States 
and Germany, Nassauer identifies a number of pathways for 
conflict, all of which involve an increase in tension/fear. In 
Nassauer’s case studies, violence requires domination on a 
micro-situational scale, but it occurs when the police no longer 
feel that they dominate the crowd; that is, when tension and 
chaos arise because their communication breaks down, the 
protesters damage property, and/or there are rumors of police 
being attacked. She finds that violence usually arises when 
police and/or protesters are uncertain and believe that they 
already have been attacked or are about to be so. Nassauer 
focuses on pathways by which violence occurs in the first 
place, whereas this study seeks to go one step further and in-
vestigate how violence evolves and how it can be considered 
an interaction ritual in its own right with a new mode and 
rhythm of interaction. 
 
1.2. Violence and Reciprocity 
This article challenges Collins’s assertion that violence con-
tradicts the human tendency of social entrainment. I argue that 
violence, once initiated, can also be reinforced exactly by this 
tendency of falling into the opponent’s rhythms. While the re-
ciprocal micro-dynamics of violent interaction are not acknowl-
edged within Collins’s theory, the social dimension of violence 
has not gone unrecognized in fields like anthropology and so-
ciology (Schröder and Schmidt 2001), notably with Simmel’s 
foundational study of the fight more than a century ago (1908 
[1950]). Interestingly, postcolonial and anthropological stud-
ies focus on violence as not exclusively destructive but also 
productive,5 by highlighting, for example, how violent acts pro-
duce and stabilize identities (Appadurai 1998) or how violent 
resistance can challenge colonization and “make” political 
IJCV: Vol. 11/2017 
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identities (Sen 2016). Likewise, several studies emphasize the 
ordering functions of violent interaction (for example Anderson 
1999). However, the argument that I propose in this article is 
different. Rather than emphasizing the different social func-
tions of violence, what I wish to point to here is the potential 
social and reciprocal nature of the violent ritual per se. Not 
how violence is meaningful for structuring social life or shaping 
identities, but how violent interaction resembles a conversa-
tion or dance where the parties mirror each other’s actions. 
This is important not only theoretically, but also in practice, as 
it may inform how violent interactions can be disrupted. 
Closer to the argument that I am here making, several studies 
emphasize the reciprocal aspect of protest violence. For exam-
ple, Donatella della Porta investigated leftwing demonstrations 
in Italy, arguing that:  
 
In these long-lasting processes, there was a reciprocal adaptation 
of tactics between police and protestors. (…) From the point of 
view of practices of violence, there was a reciprocal influence as 
well, with brutal behaviour on one side producing and reproduc-
ing brutal actions on the other. Stones, sticks and Molotov cock-
tails were used to protect the protestors from police baton 
charges; barricades were constructed to stop police; even fire-
arms were used to respond to police shooting at demonstrators. 
Escalation thus developed in action. (Della Porta 2014, 169)  
 
However, what Della Porta describes, and what others includ-
ing Collins recognize (Collins 2008, 413), is the overall action-
reaction pattern of violent atrocities giving rise to retaliation. 
What this article seeks to highlight is the smaller-scale micro-
reciprocity of violent interaction where attacks cause immedi-
ate counterattacks, back and forth.6 
 
2. Methods 
Researchers are rarely in the right place at the right time when 
violence occurs (and for security reasons, that is often more 
the wrong place at the wrong time). Video and photographs 
recorded on smartphones and uploaded to the internet and 
social media provide unprecedented material for the situa-
tional analysis of violence and nonviolence (Collins 2008; 
 
6 Importantly, I do not argue that violence is always 
symmetrical; several of the videos from Bahrain, 
Tunisia, and Syria show one-sided violence where a 
group of riot police for example attack a single pro-
Lynch 2016; Nassauer 2016), as they enable researchers to 
observe critical events and past interactions. The Arab upris-
ings are among the most intensely documented international 
conflicts when it comes to photographs and videos, as new 
media and cellphones played an essential role in the coordi-
nation, mobilization, and dissemination of the protests (Lynch 
2012): 
 
“One of the most significant aspects of the wave of protests and 
uprisings that began in Syria in 2011 has been the use of the 
mobile phone camera and small video cameras as a tool for 
documentation, political activism and creative expression” (Elias 
et al. 2014, 257). 
 
This opens new potential for analyzing the micro-sociological 
details of violence and nonviolence as it emerges and unfolds. 
To study confrontations between security forces and protesters, 
I sighted hundreds of videos of violent and nonviolent demon-
strations on YouTube and Facebook, collecting fifty-nine of par-
ticular relevance to the study.7 The selection criteria for the vi-
olent videos were 1) that the video portrayed violence or a 
potentially violent situation; 2) that both police and protesters 
were visible in the video and that both perpetrator and victim 
were visible at the time of violence (except in cases where the 
violence was clearly conducted from afar); 3) that the video 
was filmed from sufficiently close and was of sufficient quality 
to observe body postures and interaction; 4) that positions and 
identities of actors (as police or protesters) were sufficiently 
visible; and 5) that the video was not edited to the extent that 
the footage was unreliable and/or that interaction could not 
be analyzed. Collins’s empirical material on violence in riots 
mainly consists of still photographs and a few three- to five-
second video excerpts from television broadcasts (Collins 
2008, 413). My dataset of longer videos enabled me to ob-
serve sequences of violence – in some cases the entire en-
counter between protesters and police. I replayed the videos 
repeatedly in slow-motion in order to record as many details 
as possible.  
tester. Thus, violence can be either an asymmet-
rical or a symmetrical ritual depending on the situa-
tion.  
7 The video dataset, including short descriptions of 
each video, is available online: http://violence.og-
tal.dk/. The numbering of the videos cited in the 
text and footnotes refers to this dataset. 
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The videos from Syria, Bahrain, and Tunisia were only filmed 
by activists and bystanders. This creates a potential bias in the 
data, with the videos being filmed from a particular angle (the 
protesters point of view) and potentially edited to only show 
parts that the protesters would like others to see. This might 
imply that there are even more situations where protesters like-
wise attack the police than is portrayed in the data-set (which 
would however not challenge but rather support the argument 
of this article, that violence often breeds violence).  
As Wessels (2016) rightly argues, only a fraction of Syrian 
YouTube videos can be used as legal evidence for war-crimes 
prosecutions and transitional justice due to the lack of verifia-
ble contextual information, such as date, time, geographical 
location, and identity of perpetrator and victim. Likewise, using 
videos for research clearly involves many pitfalls: they only 
show a specific event, filmed from a particular angle, and some 
may even potentially be manipulated or fabricated8. Neverthe-
less, videos are the best source we have for investigating such 
situations and provide an unprecedented, information-heavy 
window into what are now historical events. Participatory ob-
servation, textual analysis, and interviewing likewise involve 
observation from a particular angle. In fact, video is better than 
participatory observation for micro-sociological analysis of in-
teractions, as observing from a safe distance and watching re-
peatedly allow greater attention to detail. That said, certain 
contextual dimensions and experiences cannot be extracted 
from videos. To better grasp these aspects of the three upris-
ings, including other unrecorded situations and ensuring eth-
nographic sensibility in the visual data analysis, I also con-
ducted participatory observation of a demonstration in Bahrain 
and fifty interviews with activists, journalists, and opposition 
politicians from Bahrain, Tunisia, and Syria. 
 
3. Cases 
Syria, Bahrain, and Tunisia present three diverse cases 
(Gerring 2008, 650) of Arab uprisings and different entry 
points to examining violence: in Tunisia, the revolution was 
successful, short, and improvised; in Bahrain, the revolution 
 
8 While some videos of Syrian bombings from 
2012 and onwards are likely to have been fabri-
has been unsuccessful thus far, prolonged, and increasingly 
very routinized; and in Syria the demonstrations were met with 
brutal violence and spiraled into civil war (Lynch 2016). Even 
though demonstrations in these three countries are diverse in 
the context of the Arab Spring (different durations, success, 
and degrees of routine), the findings suggest that similar pat-
terns of violent interaction can be identified across cases. Be-
fore proceeding to analyze the micro-dynamics of violence, an 
introduction to the three contexts of violence examined in this 
article is called for. 
 
3.1. Tunisia 
On December 17, 2010, a fruit seller, Mohamed Bouazizi, 
had his cart confiscated and was slapped in the face by a fe-
male police officer. He responded by setting himself on fire in 
front of the governor’s office in the city of Sidi Bouzid. His act 
transformed popular discontent into protests that spread to 
several other cities and finally the capital, Tunis, within a 
month (Aleya-Sghaier 2012). People from various socioeco-
nomic backgrounds participated in the protests: lawyers went 
on strike, bloggers reported the events to international media, 
and student organizations as well as labor unions organized 
demonstrations. Despite the different groups participating in 
the revolutionary actions, the protests were largely unorganized 
and improvised (Mabrouk 2011, 631). Although the uprising 
in Tunisia is sometimes portrayed as a nonviolent revolution, a 
more correct description is “popular revolution,” since the pro-
testers also committed violence in the form of stone-throwing 
and at times threw Molotov cocktails. After President Ben Ali 
resigned on January 14, 2011, the demonstrations and sit-ins 
continued in order to push for elections and prevent the mili-
tary or anyone else from Ben Ali’s closest circle coming to 
power. 
 
3.2. Bahrain 
The success of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt re-ener-
gized activism in Bahrain, where the Shia majority in particular 
had been challenging the rule of the Sunni Khalifa family for 
cated (see e.g. http://www.moonofala-
bama.org/2016/06/the-usuk-financed-white-hel-
mets-shtick-fake-child-rescued-videos.html), it is 
highly unlikely that protesters or the regime had the 
time or possibility for producing fake videos in the 
beginning of the uprising.  
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years. On February 14, 2011, activists called for a “day of 
rage,” resulting in demonstrations in several Shia villages. 
Demonstrations intensified and the protesters occupied the 
Pearl Roundabout. That night, the protesters were violently re-
moved by the police, but they returned on February 17 and 
sustained the occupation of the roundabout until March 15, 
when the protest camp was violently cleared with help from the 
Saudi Arabian armed forces (Karolak 2012). Occasional 
demonstrations have continued since then, including clashes 
between police and protesters, annual celebrations of the up-
rising, and opposition-led marches (Matthiesen 2013). The 
mass marches with thousands of participants led by the oppo-
sition parties were banned in 2014, causing a shift to smaller 
protests in the Shia villages, frequently on a daily basis. While 
the protests in 2011 were largely characterized by one-sided 
violence by the riot police and military, since then some pro-
testers have reintroduced stone-throwing and Molotov cock-
tails, which they used before 2011. 
 
3.3. Syria 
Likewise inspired by uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrian 
activists made several attempts at mobilizing the Syrian people 
against the regime headed by Bashar al Assad in early spring 
2011. Widespread demonstrations began on March 18, after 
a group of teenagers were detained and tortured for writing 
“the people want to overthrow the regime” on their school wall 
in the province of Deraa. Mobilization occurred at a slower 
pace than in Bahrain and Tunisia, and significant protests 
never reached the capital, Damascus (ICG 2011). In Syria, the 
first encounters between protesters and security forces played 
out very differently depending on the region. In Damascus, de-
monstrators were often met with riot control in the form of 
sticks and teargas, whereas activists in Homs, Deraa, and 
Hama were frequently attacked immediately with live rounds. 
President Assad offered concessions to the opposition but 
continued to violently crack down on protesters, fueling further 
demonstrations. In the course of summer 2011, parts of the 
 
9 The focus in this paper is on the first period, 
where the anti-regime demonstrations were rela-
tively comparable to the cases of Bahrain and Tuni-
sia. It therefore excludes later war-like situations in 
uprising militarized while others remained peaceful. Since 
then, the revolution has spiraled into a civil war (Lynch 2016).9 
  
4. Violence as an Interaction Ritual  
Analyzing the dataset of fifty-nine videos of violence, I found 
that violence between protesters and security forces in the in-
itial phase of the Bahraini, Syrian, and Tunisian uprisings took 
five different pathways: the perpetrator attacked from 
above/afar, from within a vehicle, from behind, at night, 
and/or attacked the outnumbered (Bramsen 2017a: 229–
46). Each pathway enables the perpetrator to avoid direct, 
face-to-face confrontation with the victim and/or to dominate 
the situation. This confirms Collins’s observation that perpetra-
tor domination precedes violence and suggests that violence 
is a form of domination ritual. A video (Figure 1) from Tunisia 
exemplifies such a situation, where violence is a form of dom-
ination and the victims surrenders to the rhythm put forward 
by the perpetrator(s).10  
 
Figure 1: Violence as domination ritual: one-sided vio-
lence against a demonstrator in Tunisia 
 
 
In a few cases, most significantly in situations in Bahrain, 
violence did not occur because activists stood their ground, 
very literally with both feet solidly on the ground and a proud 
body posture, arms stretched high in the air and a straight 
back, looking straight into the eyes of the riot police. It other 
which Syrian revolutionaries were armed with any-
thing more than stones or attacked with military 
weaponry such as barrel bombs. 
10 Video 6. 
IJCV: Vol. 11/2017 
Bramsen: How Violence Breeds Violence: Micro-dynamics and Reciprocity of Violent Interaction in the Arab Uprisings 7
 
 
 
 
 
 
words, the riot police were unable to dominate the protesters 
and thus unable to attack. This again corresponds with Col-
lins’s theory that emotional domination and/or lack of direct 
confrontation are conditions for violence. 
The visual and interview material from the authoritarian con-
texts of Syria, Bahrain, and Tunisia supports elements of the 
micro-sociological theory of violence but also forces us to re-
think them. While Collins (2004, 110–11; 2012) recognizes 
the importance of retaliation and revenge as larger patterns of 
violence, his theory does not account for the escalatory dy-
namics of violence in specific situations, possibly because his 
analysis is based mainly on pictures and a few three- to five-
second videos (Collins 2008, 413). The larger dataset of rela-
tively long videos allows me to analyze violence as interaction 
rather than as single, isolated acts. Given that violence occurs 
when one side has established situational domination, it would 
seem logical that violence would generally be one-sided; that 
is, after attacking, the situational domination would be main-
tained – if not strengthened – on the side of the perpetrator, 
and the victim would be unable to strike back. However, this 
does not seem to be the case in many situations in Bahrain, 
Syria, and Tunisia. Although there were many demonstrations 
where the protesters refrained from stone-throwing even when 
attacked, most of the video recordings show violence being 
committed by both sides.11 There are generally also very few 
videos showing the transition between nonviolent demonstra-
tions and violent clashes compared to videos showing nonvio-
lent demonstrations or violent clashes, respectively. Violence, 
it seems, is not easy. When it does occur, however, it acquires 
a self-perpetuating, escalatory dynamic. A truism in conflict 
studies is that “violence breeds violence” (for example Galtung 
1990).12 This seems to be the case on the ground in protests 
in Bahrain, Syria, and Tunisia. More often than not, violence 
occurs in response to violence. One of the most frequent inter-
actions before a violent act, and thus the best predictor for 
further violence, is a preceding violent act. When I asked ac-
 
11 Videos 1, 19, 29–39, 50–52. 
12 Galtung’s assumption about violence breeding 
violence also includes cultural and structural forms 
tivists why they threw stones, they all described it as a “natu-
ral” reaction to police violence.13 This lack of reflectiveness 
around violent counterattacks by protesters suggests that is 
often experienced as a reflex and thus part of an action-reac-
tion pattern. 
An illustrative example from Bahrain reveals a complicated 
sequence that initially supports Collins’s theory in terms of 
domination preceding violence, but once the violence has be-
gun such dynamics seems to become less important. The video 
shows a group of police running away from protesters. When 
one policeman stumbles and falls, he is attacked by a pro-
tester who beats him with a stick and tries to get the teargas 
grenade gun out of his hands (Figure 2, left). This corresponds 
with Collins’s theory about attacking the weak and fallen. 
Shortly afterwards, four other protesters arrive. Before they can 
attack the policeman, however, the apparent attempt by the 
protester to wrest the teargas gun out of his hands results in 
the protester inadvertently helping him to his feet. The activist 
who accidentally helped the policeman runs away and a few 
others take over; one comes running from behind and throws 
a stone at the policeman while another tries to push him back 
down. Still facing the protesters, the officer shoots the pro-
tester closest to him in the face with the teargas gun, even 
though he is still outnumbered (Figure 2, right). He then runs 
away toward the other policemen.14 While the attack on the 
fallen and outnumbered policeman is a clear case of situa-
tional domination, this is not the case for his counterattack, 
given that he is outnumbered, is face to face with the man he 
attacks, and runs away immediately afterwards; instead, this 
is a case of violence following action-reaction patterns where 
a victim is likely to fight back if he or she is physically/materi-
ally equipped to do so and is not completely paralyzed by the 
attack. It seems as though once violence breaks out; violent 
acts occur as spontaneous reactions that are less shaped by 
emotional domination. 
 
 
of violence. Here I only refer to direct forms of vio-
lence being self-reinforcing.  
13 Interviews conducted by the author with a Tuni-
sian activist (March 2015) and a Syrian activist 
(January 2016). 
14 Video 27. 
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Another video from Bahrain shows a longer fight emphasizing 
the same point. A protester runs out of the scattered crowd of 
peaceful protesters and throws a stone into a group of riot po-
lice. He comes closer and is repeatedly shot at with teargas at 
close range. He falls down and is shot with teargas again when 
he gets to his feet (Figure 3, left). Subsequently, several pro-
testers run toward the police and throw whatever is available – 
stones, garbage cans, and garbage – at the police who re-
spond with teargas (Figure 3, right).15 
 
 
Figure 3: Fighting between Bahraini riot police and pro-
testers 
 
15 Video 28. 
 
In Collins’s theorization of violence, a violent act is a broken 
interaction ritual that contradicts the human tendency to be-
come rhythmically entrained and “fall into solidarity” with oth-
ers (Collins 2008, 82). By contrast, the two fights described 
above – as well as numerous videos of attacks and counter-
attacks between police and protesters in Tunisia, Syria, and 
Bahrain – illustrate violent action-reaction sequences where 
the parties rhythmically mirror each other’s actions.16 If a per-
son is attacked and the situation allows it, they are likely to 
fight back (in fact, it might actually be more difficult not to do 
so). Not just for revenge or self-defense, but because of emo-
tional attunement, mirroring, and action-reaction mechanisms. 
A fight can even be said to resemble a conversation or dance 
16 Videos 1, 19, 29–39, 50–52. 
Figure 2: Attack on fallen riot police member in Bahrain (left); policeman is inadvertently helped to his 
feet and shoots a protester (right). 
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with rhythmic turn-taking. One Tunisian activist described to 
me how the fighting on the streets would take the form of at-
tacking and running away: “and then we run away, and then 
we come back, and then we run away.”17 The fighting is asym-
metrical in the sense that the police are well-equipped and 
attack with live ammunition and teargas, whereas protesters 
have stones and/or Molotov cocktails. Yet the fighting ritual 
being performed is one of symmetrical fighting, each respond-
ing rhythmically to the other’s attacks. 
In some cases, especially in Syria, protesters even threw 
stones at security forces (and were met with gunfire) from dis-
tances of one or two hundred meters (Figure 4).18 Throwing 
stones in a situation where they are unlikely to hurt or even 
reach the opponent may be associated with stone-throwing 
being a symbol of resistance in the Arab world (Pearlman 
2011), but it also fits with the idea of fighting as symmetrical 
ritual.19  
 
Figure 4: Mutual violence at a distance between Syrian 
protesters and regime forces. 
 
 
17 Interview with Tunisian activist, conducted by the 
author (March 2015). 
18 Videos 50, 51. 
19 For further discussion of why stone-throwing 
should be considered a violent act see Pressman 
(2017). 
In an article from 2013 Collins acknowledges that violence 
can be considered an interaction ritual, although only “an ex-
tremely asymmetrical interaction ritual, with strong common 
focus of attention by both sides, attackers and victim, and tight 
rhythmic coordination; but the rhythm is set entirely by one 
side, and the other side is forced to accede to it” (2013, 
142).20 On the contrary, I argue that violence need not be 
asymmetrical; it can also be mutual, rhythmic entrainment, as 
seen in cooperative interactions.21 In other words, violence can 
be observed both as an asymmetrical domination ritual and as 
a symmetrical conflict ritual, depending on whether or not the 
victim is too dominated to fight back. This does not rule out 
Collins’s assumption that violence initially “runs counter to the 
basic mechanisms of emotional entrainment and interactional 
solidarity” (Collins 2008, 25), but it suggests that once vio-
lence occurs it can likewise be driven (rather than inhibited) by 
emotional entrainment and the tendency to fall into the 
rhythms of the opponent. Violence breaks normal modes of 
interaction but – like other forms of intense interaction (such 
as sexual interaction) – once instigated violent interaction cre-
ates a new rhythm and mode of interaction with a certain mo-
mentum that is difficult to disrupt.  
 
5. Conclusion 
On the basis of visual data, human rights reports, interviews, 
and participant observation, I found that the violence occurring 
in demonstrations in the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Syria, and 
Bahrain followed five pathways corresponding with Collins’s 
theory of violence, in the sense of attacking vulnerable victims 
without face-to-face confrontation. I also found examples from 
Bahrain and Syria where violence was avoided at least in part 
due to situational circumstances of eye contact and emotional 
equilibrium between police and protesters. While it is not easy 
to initiate a violent interaction ritual, I argue that, once insti-
gated, violence is less conditioned by perpetrator domination 
20 Collins does not explicitly rule out that violence 
could take the form of a symmetrical ritual; he 
simply does not mention this possibility. His argu-
ment that violence is preceded by emotional domi-
nance would imply (unless otherwise explicated) 
that this domination continues throughout the vio-
lent interaction.  
21 Unlike solidarity interactions, violence generally 
does not generate solidarity among participants 
(friendly fights are perhaps exceptions here). Ra-
ther violence is either a form of domination energiz-
ing one party and deenergizing the other or a form 
of conflict ritual energizing both parties with nega-
tive emotional energy (Boyns and Luery 2015, 
Bramsen 2017b).  
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and acquires its own self-perpetuating dynamic where the par-
ties mirror each other in a pattern of action-reaction. Unlike 
what might otherwise be expected from Collins’s theory about 
emotional domination conditioning violence, violent interac-
tion rituals are often not one-sided and asymmetrical. On the 
contrary, many of the situations in my data resemble a dance-
like sequence of action-reaction, where the opponents re-
spond to each other’s attacks like in a dance. Collins’s argu-
ment that violence contradicts the human tendency to become 
entrained in other people’s rhythms and emotions might hold 
when violence is first initiated and thus breaks an established 
mode of interaction. But once an attack has been initiated, the 
“social” reaction by the counterpart is to respond. Violence 
then no longer goes against the tendency to connect and be-
come attuned with other people, but instead  defines the mode 
of interaction that both parties engage in. In such situations it 
might require much more emotional energy and training to ac-
tually avoid engaging in violent interaction, as exemplified by 
training of activists to respond nonviolently to violent attacks 
(Vinthagen 2015). 
The argument that violence is reciprocal might be fairly com-
monsensical; it is well-accepted that violence breeds violence, 
at least over time. The specific contribution of this paper is 
twofold: firstly, to challenge Collins’s theory of violence as 
merely an asymmetrical form of interaction, and secondly to 
show empirically how violence evolves reciprocally, mirroring 
social interaction, even on a small scale.  
What is gained in practice by considering violence as a form 
of conflict or domination ritual? Firstly, I would argue that this 
perspective is useful in violence prevention, as it implies going 
beyond normative condemnation of violence (as it is common 
in nonviolent resistance), and emphasizes the importance of 
training people how to react when attacked and to resist the 
tendency to mirror the attack of the other. Secondly, it raises 
questions of how violent rituals can be disrupted. Like any 
other ritual, violence has a certain momentum that may be 
possible to break for example through nonviolent actions re-
sponding to the violent act with neither submission nor coun-
terattack. If protesters give flowers, say “thank you,” or initiate 
other rituals of fraternization (Ketchley 2014), it may be chal-
lenging for violent actors to initiate or continue the violent rit-
ual.   
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